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During the past decades, many countries experienced considerable capital flight. Residents 
moved their wealth abroad, using different ways to accumulate foreign assets. Since the 
1990s, several of these countries reformed their domestic financial markets in an attempt to 
improve the functioning of their domestic financial systems and to increase the efficiency of 
resource allocation—that is, to enhance financial development. In this paper, we examine the 
relationship between financial liberalization and capital flight, with special emphasis on 
countries on the African continent, and carry out an empirical analysis using data for a sample 
of 18 countries from this region for the period 1973–2005. We find that whereas reforms 
related to opening up domestic banking markets for new domestic and foreign entrants and 
bank privatization programs seem to reduce capital flight, policies focusing on liberalizing the 
capital account increase capital flight. 
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Since the early 1970s, several countries, and especially many in the African region, have 
experienced considerable capital flight. Capital flight refers to residents moving their wealth 
abroad, using different ways to accumulate foreign assets. As has been argued in the 
literature, this may have strongly detrimental effects on domestic investment, economic 
growth, tax income, and poverty (Tornell and Velasco, 1992; Collier et al., 2004; Beja, 2007a; 
Yalta, 2010; African Development Bank et al., 2012). At the same time, since the early 1980s, 
many countries, including several in Africa, have reformed their domestic financial markets in 
an attempt to improve the functioning of their domestic financial systems and to increase the 
efficiency of resource allocation—that is, to enhance financial development (Fowowe, 2013). 
These reforms were triggered by both domestic and international developments. On the one 
hand, government policies focusing on controlling financial markets were increasingly 
criticized, because they were seen as causing the inefficient functioning and development of 
domestic financial institutions (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). On the other hand, 
globalization of financial markets put pressure on governments to reduce financial market and 
capital account controls. The general belief was that lifting these controls and integrating with 
the world economy would ultimately contribute to enhanced economic growth. For this 
reason, financial reforms have been strongly promoted by, among others, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
A considerable part of the literature has focused on discussing potential factors that may 
determine the occurrence and size of capital flight (Hermes et al., 2004). Interestingly, 
investigating the relationship between financial liberalization and capital flight has been 
almost left untouched, notable exceptions being studies by Lensink et al. (1998) and Yalta and 
Yalta (2012). In this paper we extend the research into this relationship, with special emphasis 
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on African countries. The paper begins with a discussion of the theory that supports the 
possible relationship between financial liberalization and capital flight. Next, we develop an 
empirical analysis of the relationship. We start by discussing our measurement of the different 
concepts. Financial liberalization may have different dimensions, which may influence the 
potential for capital flight in different ways. We then carry out the empirical analysis using 
data on financial liberalization (from Abiad et al., 2010) for a sample of 18 African countries 
for the period 1973–2005. Our results may contribute to discussions about financial 
liberalization policies for countries that lack capital and have been prone to capital flight. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we elaborate on how 
financial liberalization may impact capital flows in general and capital flight in particular. 
Sections 3 and 4 then discuss the measurement of the central concepts in the analysis, namely, 
financial liberalization and capital flight. In these sections, we also discuss briefly the trends 
in these variables for the 18 African countries in our sample for the period 1973–2005. After 
describing the empirical method and the data sources used for the other variables in section 5, 
we discuss the results of the multivariate analysis in section 6. The paper concludes with a 
summary and discussion of limitations in section 7. 
2. Financial liberalization and capital flight: A review 
2.1 The link between financial development and financial liberalization 
There is a large literature, both theoretical and empirical, emphasizing the importance of 
developed financial markets and institutions in the process of economic development and 
growth. Financial markets and institutions provide several crucial services such as savings 
mobilization, agglomeration of financial resources, diversifying and pooling risk, maturity 
transformation, and screening, monitoring and enforcing investment projects (Levine, 2005). 
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In providing these services, they efficiently transform savings into investment, raising both 
the quantity and quality of investment projects. Moreover, they provide a payment system that 
makes trade among economic participants more efficient. Financial development occurs when 
a financial system improves on performing these functions. Ultimately, this should contribute 
to higher levels of economic development. In a series of papers using an extensive multi-
country panel data set, King and Levine (1993a, 1993b, and 1993c) empirically show that the 
level of financial development is strongly associated with the growth of real GDP per capita, 
the rate of physical capital accumulation, and the productivity of physical capital available in 
an economy. Their results have been generally confirmed in later studies. It has also been 
shown that legal structures are important determinants of how financial systems evolve 
(Levine, 1999). 
Closely related to the discussion of the relationship between finance and growth is the 
discussion of the role financial liberalization plays in this relationship. In the empirical 
literature, financial liberalization includes official government policies that focus on 
deregulating credit and interest rate controls, removing entry barriers for foreign financial 
institutions, privatizing financial institutions, and removing restrictions on foreign financial 
transactions (i.e., opening up the capital account). As is clear from this typology, financial 
liberalization policies focus on introducing or strengthening the price mechanism in financial 
markets, as well as on improving the conditions for market competition. According to theory, 
these elements of financial liberalization help improve the provision of financial services by 
financial institutions as described above in that they contribute to financial development. For 
households and firms, these policies are expected to have an impact on financial decision 
making as the improved provision of financial services is associated with changing prices, 
transaction costs, and returns on investment, as well as to changing the barriers to bank 
ownership and access to finance for firm investment. Financial liberalization thus leads to 
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changing the allocation of (domestic and international) capital, which ultimately also affects 
the overall growth rate of a country. 
The relationship between financial liberalization and economic growth has been extensively 
discussed in the literature. The empirical literature is not conclusive about whether financial 
liberalization and growth are indeed correlated positively (Bumann et al., 2013). This may at 
least partly be due to the fact that liberalization potentially has both positive and negative 
consequences for the functioning of financial institutions and markets. On the one hand, it has 
been argued that financial markets are the most efficient mechanism to allocating scarce 
resources (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Introducing market principles and competition in 
the banking sector increases interest rates on deposits. These higher interest rates lead to 
higher saving and investment rates, ultimately contributing to higher growth rates. This also 
holds for opening up the capital account as part of a financial liberalization strategy. Such a 
policy may stimulate capital inflows, which raises the availability of funds for investment and 
growth. Moreover, increasing competition puts pressure on the profit margins of banks, in 
particular on the interest rates demanded for loans. This reduces the cost of debt, leading to a 
rise in investment and growth. Furthermore, in a more competitive environment, financial 
institutions are stimulated to become more efficient. This leads to reducing overhead costs, 
improving overall bank management, improving risk management, and offering new financial 
instruments and services (possibly including those imported after capital account 
liberalization) to the market to keep up with competitors.  
On the other hand, however, it has also been argued that financial liberalization may not solve 
the problem of asymmetric information, preventing financial intermediation from becoming 
more efficient in a liberalized environment (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). It has even been argued 
that due to financial liberalization, information problems become worse, because increasing 
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competition leads to a breakdown of relationship lending, which destroys information capital 
(Boot, 2000). Moreover, competition in financial markets may also imply a reduction in profit 
margins, contributing to increased financial fragility of financial institutions, as this makes 
them more prone to financial disruption and stimulates them to conduct risk taking behavior 
in order to try to remain being profitable under the pressure of falling profit margins. For 
example, reduced margins may stimulate banks to economize on screening and monitoring 
efforts and to opt for a gambling strategy when allocating loans, putting less emphasis on risk 
and more on profit. In this case, financial liberalization triggers crises if it leads to excessive 
risk taking under the pressure of increased competition (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 
1998). 
2.2 Financial liberalization and capital flight: Theory and previous empirical research 
Some studies discussing the relationship between financial liberalization policies and growth 
have investigated the impact of these policies on capital flows (Labán and Larraín, 1997; 
Montiel and Reinhart, 1999; Aghion et al., 2004; Desai et al., 2006; and Alfaro et al., 2007). 
We add to this literature by focusing on the impact of financial liberalization on capital 
outflows from African countries, using a measure that takes into account both recorded and 
unrecorded capital outflows, i.e., capital flight. In the literature there are two main approaches 
to measuring capital flight: the hot money approach and the residual approach. According to 
the hot money approach, capital flight is defined as short-term private capital flows 
(associated with other sectors, i.e., excluding the official sector and banks) plus net errors and 
omissions in the balance of payments (Cuddington, 1986). The residual approach stresses that 
recorded flows are not capital flight. According to this approach, capital flight is measured as 
the difference (or residual) between recorded inflows and recorded uses of foreign exchange 
(World Bank, 1985). Yet, it also acknowledges that in the balance of payments, statistics data 
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on external debt inflows are often underreported, which is why data from the World Debt 
Tables are used instead, because the World Bank collects more detailed and accurate data on 
foreign debt. This adjustment generally leads to recorded inflows being higher than recorded 
uses of funds, establishing the size of outflows not recorded in the balance of payments, i.e., 
capital flight. These unrecorded outflows may result from illegal transactions such as money 
laundering and tax evasion, among others. In this study we use the residual approach to 
measure capital flight.1  
In the theoretical literature discussing the determinants of capital flight, several explanations 
have been put forward, ranging from structural factors (i.e., resource abundance, in 
combination with poor regulation and bad governance of the home country), the 
macroeconomic environment (i.e., the home country’s economic growth performance, 
inflation, and fiscal policies), factors related to portfolio choice decisions of the home 
country’s wealth holders (i.e., risk and returns to private investments), the quality of 
governance of the home country (i.e., the extent of corruption, the quality of regulation), the 
importance of external borrowing, the importance of the political environment, and hysteresis 
and habit formation (Ndikumana et al., 2014).  
Our discussion of the association between capital flight and financial liberalization policies is 
based on two theoretical pillars. One pillar is related to models and theories emphasizing risk 
and returns to private investments and the related portfolio decisions of residents holding 
domestic wealth (see also Murinde et al., 2014). According to these models, individuals may 
have incentives to take their wealth abroad, for example when net rates of return on holding 
foreign assets may be higher, when they aim at diversifying their portfolio by including 
foreign assets, when they expect that domestic taxes, tariffs, or laws and/or monetary and 
                                                          
1
 See Ndikumana et al. (2014) for a more in-depth discussion of the measurement of capital flight. 
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fiscal policies (reflected by changes in inflation and/or exchange rates) reduce the net rate of 
return, and/or when they fear that political instability and/or the quality of (political) 
institutions (increasing the risk of expropriation) may hurt their wealth held domestically. 
Thus, if risk-adjusted returns to private investments are relatively higher for foreign than for 
domestic assets, residents decide to hold their wealth outside their own country. We argue 
that, at least potentially, financial liberalization influences risk-adjusted returns to private 
investments. 
The second pillar stresses the importance of restrictions on international capital flows. Rather 
than emphasizing arguments why residents may have incentives to shift money abroad, here 
we focus on the existence or absence of formal barriers that allow these residents to allocate 
their wealth outside their own country. As capital account liberalization in terms of reducing 
capital controls is one of the elements of financial liberalization, these policies obviously have 
a direct impact on the extent to which formal barriers to capital flows are in place. 
Based on the two pillars discussed above, it may be argued that financial liberalization can 
impact capital flight both positively and negatively. First, from a portfolio model point of 
view, financial liberalization may both have a positive and a negative impact on the extent of 
capital flight. On the one hand, by liberalizing financial markets, returns on investments go up 
as prices (interest rates) go up and/or transaction costs go down. This increases the 
attractiveness of holding wealth in the home country compared to holding money abroad. 
Moreover, residents may see financial liberalization policies as a credible signal of the 
government’s commitment to sound economic management. Based on this signal, they may 
expect improved domestic policy making, reduced policy uncertainty and enhanced 
institutional quality (Kose et al., 2008). Several studies have stressed that financial 
liberalization policies, and opening the capital account in particular, may discipline 
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governments with respect to their fiscal and monetary policy (Obstfeld, 1998; Stiglitz, 2000). 
The expected improvement of domestic policies, in turn, reduces the risk of investing wealth 
in the home country—that is, it reduces incentives for capital flight. On the other hand, 
however, financial liberalization policies may also be seen as increasing uncertainties about 
macroeconomic developments, such as enlarging the risk of financial crises. If this is the case, 
the risk of investing at home increases, providing an incentive for residents to divert wealth 
abroad. In other words, capital flight goes up (Epstein, 2005). 
Second, the impact on capital flight of reducing the barriers to capital flows through capital 
account liberalization is also not clear a priori. On the one hand, abolishing capital controls 
means it becomes easier to shift money abroad. Individuals have many incentives to invest 
their wealth abroad. They may do so because net rates of return on holding foreign assets may 
be higher, they expect domestic taxes, tariffs, laws, and/or monetary and fiscal policies to 
reduce the net rate of return, and/or they fear political instability and/or the quality of 
(political) institutions may hurt their wealth. For any of the above reasons, financial 
liberalization provides stronger incentives to allocate capital outside the country (Dutta, 
2011). On the other hand, however, capital account liberalization may also reduce capital 
flight. Without capital controls, it is easier for residents to transfer money abroad, reducing 
incentives to illegally transfer money into foreign assets. Moreover, if investors aim at 
diversifying their portfolio but capital controls and other restrictions inhibit such a 
diversification strategy, this may lead to capital flight. In this situation, financial liberalization 
may reduce incentives for capital flight because capital can move freely. Due to liberalization, 
illegal flows turn into legal flows (Mody and Murshid, 2005).2 
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 An alternative view may be that financial liberalization has no relationship with capital flight, because 
residents may have other reasons than those related to portfolio decisions and/or the existence/absence of 
formal barriers to capital flows to hold their wealth abroad. They may engage in capital flight, for example, 
because their wealth has been generated through illegal transactions and/or corruption, or they want to avoid 
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In the literature the relationship between financial liberalization and capital flight has hardly 
been addressed empirically. One of the few studies investigating the relationship between 
financial liberalization and capital flight is by Lensink et al. (1998). The analysis in this study 
is based on a portfolio model, in which capital flight is one of the assets, alongside bank 
deposits, fixed assets, and net other assets.3 This portfolio model is estimated using data from 
nine sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1971–1990. Next, the estimation results of 
the portfolio model are used in a more complete structural model of the economy, including 
the banking sector, the government, and the external sector. Using this structural model, 
Lensink et al. (1998) analyze the impact of three types of financial market liberalization 
measures on capital flight, namely, an increase of the nominal interest rate on bank deposits, a 
decrease in reserve requirements, and a change in the exchange rate policy. The simulation 
results indicate that these policy measures reduce capital flight, but the effects are very small. 
The authors therefore conclude that while financial liberalization policies may be helpful, it 
should certainly not be seen as a panacea for curtailing capital flight. 
In another, more recent, study Yalta and Yalta (2012) also focus on the causal link between 
financial liberalization and capital flight. The approach of their research is different from the 
previous study. Yalta and Yalta (2012) apply panel data regressions using data for 21 
emerging economies for the period 1980–2004. Whereas Lensink et al. (1998) look at the 
impact of domestic banking reforms, Yalta and Yalta (2012) focus on capital control 
liberalization, as measured by Chinn and Ito (2008). They find no evidence of a causal 
relationship between financial liberalization policies and capital flight. Their findings are 
slightly different from that of Lensink et al. (1998), which may be due to the differences in the 
country sample, time period, and/or empirical method applied. In the context of our study, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
paying taxes, among others. In the empirical analysis, we check for this possibility by adding various control 
variables to our model, which may pick up these alternative reasons for residents to engage in capital flight. 
3
 See also Collier et al. (2001) for a similar approach. 
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Lensink et al. (1998) seems most interesting as a reference point, since they also focus on the 
sub-Saharan African region and use a portfolio model framework. 
Next to these two empirical studies, descriptive country case studies have been carried out by 
Schneider (2003) and in Epstein (2005). These studies generally find no evidence that capital 
flight diminishes after countries have liberalized their financial markets.  
Given the above ambiguity (both theoretical as well as empirical), analyzing the relationship 
between financial liberalization and capital flight becomes an empirical question. We will 
address this question in the remainder of this paper. 
3. Measuring financial liberalization 
The literature distinguishes three broad categories of financial liberalization measures, namely, 
capital account liberalization, equity market liberalization, and banking sector liberalization. 
Most authors rely exclusively on capital account measures (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001; 
Edison et al., 2004; Kose et al., 2006; Prasad et al., 2003; Quinn and Toyoda, 2008). These 
measures can be divided into two subcategories. De jure measures reflect the existence of legal 
restrictions on international capital transactions, in most cases based on information from the 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) of the IMF. 
De facto measures refer to actual flows and stocks of capital. Some studies focus on 
investigating the impact of equity market liberalization, using measures of restrictions on the 
international sale/purchase of equities (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Bekaert et al., 2005). Others 
examine banking market liberalization by looking at government policies on interest 
deregulation and relaxing credit allocation regulations (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; 
Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2003). 
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In this paper we do not restrict the analysis to one specific type of financial liberalization policy, 
but seek to find evidence for a relationship between various dimensions of financial 
liberalization and capital flight. This is because, at least in theory, any type of financial 
liberalization can change the risks and returns to investments, which may lead to a reallocation 
of wealth between home and foreign assets. For this purpose, we use a dataset developed by 
Abiad et al. (2010). This dataset takes into account six different dimensions of financial 
liberalization policies and one measure of bank regulation policies for a set of 91 developed and 
developing countries during the period 1973–2005. More precisely, using this dataset we have 
the following information: 
− Credit controls and reserve requirements: focuses on directed credit 
towards favored sectors or industries, ceilings on credit toward sectors, and minimum reserve 
requirements; 
− Interest rate controls: deals with direct interest rate controls by the 
government, and/or interest rate controls through the use of floors, ceilings, and interest rate 
bands; 
− Entry barriers: deals with licensing requirements for newly established 
domestic financial institutions, entry barriers for foreign banks, and restrictions on certain types 
of banking practices, such as specialized bank services or establishing universal banks; 
− State ownership in the banking sector: refers to the share of the banking 
sector assets controlled by state-owned banks; 
− Restrictions on international financial transactions: refers to capital 
account controls and restrictions, transaction taxes, and the use of multiple exchange rates; 
− Securities market policies: relates to policies with respect to the auctioning 
of government securities, the establishment of securities markets, tax incentives related to 
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investments in securities, and policies regarding the openness of markets to foreign investors; 
and 
− Prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector: refers to (1) 
the adoption of risk-based capital adequacy ratios based on the Basel standard; (2) the degree of 
independence of the banking supervisory agency; and (3) the coverage of supervisory oversight. 
For this dimension, more government intervention is interpreted as a positive reform policy, one 
that contributes to improving the efficiency of the banking system. 
For each of the above dimensions, a country obtains a score that runs from zero to three. For the 
six dimensions reflecting financial liberalization, the meaning of the scores is as follows: 0 
means that for a particular dimension of financial liberalization policies, the financial markets 
are fully repressed; 1 means partial repression; 2 means largely liberalized; and 3 means fully 
liberalized.4 Repression or liberalization of a certain dimension thus refers to the extent to 
which the government interferes with financial markets. For the last dimension, describing the 
regulation and supervision of the banking sector, the interpretation of the scores is different. 
Here, 0 means that the country has put in place none of three dimensions of regulation and 
supervision (i.e., capital adequacy ratios, independency of the central bank and a wide 
coverage of supervisory oversight); 1 means that the country has put in place one of the three 
dimensions of regulation and supervision; 2 means that the country has put in place two of the 
three dimensions of regulation and supervision; and 3 means that the country has put in place 
all three dimensions of regulation and supervision. We create an overall financial 
liberalization measure by adding up the separate scores for each of the seven financial 
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liberalization dimensions.5 The overall measure has a score that can take values between 0 
and 21. 
The financial reform dataset we use has several advantages over other measures used in the 
literature. First, our data allow for identifying changes in financial liberalization policies over 
time, as well as for quantifying the extent to which these policies contribute to reforming 
financial markets. Second, as was mentioned above, in several papers the analysis focuses on 
just one or a few dimensions of financial reform. Yet, financial liberalization policies consist 
of a range of different dimensions, which may either influence the risk and returns on 
investment and thus the portfolio decisions of the residents of a country, or change the extent 
to which barriers to moving capital flows across borders are in place, which may affect the 
extent of capital flight. Specifically, financial liberalization may affect portfolio decisions in 
along the following lines: 
– Relaxing interest rate controls leads to rising interest rates on deposits; 
– Reducing or abolishing credit control policies and reserve requirements increases the 
efficient allocation of resources by banks, which, in a competitive bank market environment, 
will also increase the interest rates on deposits; 
– Relaxing entry barriers for banks and bank privatization programs have a similar 
impact on deposit rates, because both these policies increase bank competition. At the same 
time, however, increasing bank competition may also increase the probability of financial 
crises, which raises the risk of investing in the home country; 
– Policies focusing on developing equity markets contribute to making these markets 
more efficient, ultimately leading to higher market returns; 
                                                          
5
 We use this approach following Abiad et al. (2010). 
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– Liberalizing the capital account directly contributes to lowering the barriers to capital 
outflows; 
– Establishing or improving the financial regulation and supervision of banks increases 
the stability of the banking sector, which may reduce the probability of financial crises. This, 
in turn, may contribute to reducing the risk on domestic investments; 
– Finally, all of the above may act as a signal of credible and prudent macroeconomic 
policies, which may reduce the risk of investing in the home country.  
Therefore, all possible dimensions of financial liberalization policies should be taken into 
account when we evaluate their impact on capital flight. 
Figure 1 summarizes the overall trends in financial liberalization policies in Africa during the 
period 1973–2005.6 The figure shows when reforms and reversals of reforms took place. 
Moreover, it indicates incidents of large policy reforms and reversals (i.e., a change of the 
overall financial liberalization measure of three points or more). As can be seen from this 
figure, most policy changes took place during the period 1990–1998. During these years, in 
more than 40 percent of the countries in our dataset financial reforms were carried out. 
Moreover, in most years during this period, large reforms were observed. This is especially 
true for the years 1993 and 1996. Interestingly, a few countries also reversed some of the 
liberalization policies. This particularly holds for 1994, when two of the eighteen countries 
returned to partly regulating their financial markets. The pattern of liberalization policies in 
Africa deviates at least to some extent from the worldwide trend of liberalization during the 
period 1973–2005 as observed in Abiad et al. (2010). Whereas worldwide financial 
liberalization policies were carried out on a large scale since the early 1980s, in Africa the 
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period of liberalization took off in the 1990s. At the same time, as in Africa, most of the 
liberalization policies were carried out during the first half of the 1990s. 
<Figure 1 here> 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the various financial liberalization measures. First, the 
table shows that on average the value of the overall financial liberalization measure for the 
period 1973–2005 was slightly above 7. This is considerably lower as compared to the 
averages for countries in other regions (Abiad et al., 2010), indicating that financial 
liberalization policies have been pursued much less strongly in Africa than in countries in 
Latin America and Asia. Next, the table shows that relaxing entry barriers for financial 
institutions is the most widely used type of financial liberalization in the countries in our 
sample (average 1.6), followed by relaxing credit and interest rate controls (1.27 and 1.2, 
respectively). Financial regulation measures have been pursued the least (0.43). Large policy 
changes (liberalizations as well as reversals) occurred only very infrequently. 
<Table 1 here> 
Figure 2 and Table 2 present the trends in financial liberalization policies for individual 
countries. Figure 2 shows that, whereas at the beginning of the 1970s the overall financial 
liberalization measure varied between 0 and 8, in the mid-2000s the measure had increased to 
between 14 and 18. The figure also shows that in most African countries the strong wave of 
liberalization policies started in the early 1990s. The group of strongly reforming countries 
include South Africa, Nigeria, Tanzania, Madagascar, Kenya, and Uganda. Among the weak 
reformers are countries such as Ethiopia, Algeria, Ghana, Zimbabwe, and Cameroon. Table 2 
shows the same information, this time presenting the country-specific five-year averages of 
the value of the overall financial liberalization measure, focusing on the first six of the seven 
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policy measures. The table highlights (in bold) periods and countries during which major 
reforms took place, corresponding to changes in the financial liberalization measure of five or 
more points. As expected, in almost all cases these major reforms took place during the first 
half of the 1990s. 
<Figure 2> 
<Table 2> 
4. Capital flight measurement 
As discussed previously, in the literature several methods of measuring capital flight are 
available. Among these, the so-called residual method, proposed by the World Bank (1985), 
has received by far the most attention. The residual method calculates capital flight as the 
residual difference between capital inflows and recorded foreign exchange outflows. Capital 
inflows are calculated based on debt stocks reported in the World Bank’s Global Development 
Finance. The recorded foreign exchange outflows are obtained from Balance-of-Payments 
Tables published by the IMF. In this paper, we use the residual method, but take into account 
a number of refinements proposed by Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) and Ndikumana and 
Boyce (2010). More specifically, we calculate capital flight for country i in year t as: 
CFit = ∆ DEBTADJit + DFIit − (CAit + ∆ RESit) + MISINVit    
 (1) 
where CF is the amount of capital flight for country i in year t; ∆ DEBTADJ is the change in 
the country’s stock of external debt, adjusted for cross-currency exchange rate fluctuations in 
order to take into account the fact that debt is denominated in various currencies and then 
aggregated in US dollars; DFI is net direct foreign investment; CA is the current account 
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deficit; ∆ RES is the change in the stock of international reserves; and MISINV is net trade 
misinvoicing (Ndikumana and Boyce, 2011). All variables in the equation are in 2010 US 
dollars and are normalized by dividing by GDP (GNP). The specification in equation (1) 
contains two refinements of the original residual method specification as developed by the 
World Bank (1985). First, it incorporates adjustments for trade misinvoicing (Lessard and 
Williamson, 1987). Second, it makes adjustments for the impact of exchange rate fluctuations 
on the dollar value of external debt. Ndikumana and Boyce (2010) make two further 
refinements to the specification expressed in equation (1). First, they adjust the change in debt 
to account for debt write-offs. This may be important in order to correctly calculate the stock 
of debt and the value of debt service. On the one hand, debt write-offs lead to a reduction of 
the stock of debt. At the same time, however, write-offs do not lead to changes in the flow of 
debt service. Therefore, not correcting for debt write-offs may lead to an overstatement of 
debt service and an understatement of the year-to-year change. Second, Ndikumana and 
Boyce (2010) include an adjustment for the underreporting of remittances. 
Table 3 provides information about trends in capital flight during the period 1973–2005. 
During this period, annual average capital flight from the 18 countries in the sample amounted 
to almost 1.5 billion US dollars (in real 2010 US dollars). Capital flight was especially high 
during the periods 1976–1978, 1985–1987 and 2000–2002 when the annual average outflows 
were around 2.5 billion US dollars. Outflows were relatively modest during 1997–1999 when 
they amounted to only 400 million US dollars annually. In absolute terms, the largest amount 
of capital flight over the entire 1973–2005 period has been recorded for Algeria, Nigeria, 
South Africa, and Cote d’Ivoire. The smallest amount of capital flight has been recorded for 
Burkina Faso, Uganda, Ghana, and Madagascar.  
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In relative terms, average annual outflows for the 18 countries in the sample were 5.5 percent 
of GDP. As shown in table 3, capital flight was by far the highest for Mozambique (on 
average 21 percent of GDP during the period 1985–2005), followed by Cote d’Ivoire (11 
percent of GDP during 1973–2005) and Algeria (9 percent). It was low as a ratio of GDP for 
Burkina Faso (1.5 percent), Uganda (2.0 percent) and South Africa (2.3 percent). In table 3 
the five-year average capital flight to GDP ratios of 10 percent or higher are highlighted (in 
bold). As expected, Mozambique experienced several episodes of high capital flight. This also 
holds for Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Madagascar. Interestingly, the highest reversal of capital 
flight is also recorded for Mozambique (during 2003–2005). 
<Table 3> 
5. Data and methods 
We use data for 18 African countries, namely, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. As discussed in section 4, 
our financial liberalization data are from Abiad et al. (2010). The data for capital flight are 
from Ndikumana and Boyce (2010). Information regarding the macroeconomic control 
variables mainly comes from the World Development Indicators. Data for the political regime 
variable is from the Polity IV project database.7 
Our dependent variable is the real capital flight to real GDP ratio. We investigate whether the 
value of this ratio can be explained by our measure of financial liberalization, adding a set of 
control variables that have been shown to be potentially important in explaining capital flight 
in previous studies. Our empirical model can thus be described as follows: 
                                                          
7
 See the following website: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
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CFit = αit + βitFINLIBit + γitMit + εit            (2) 
where CF is the amount of capital flight for country i in year t; α the constant term; FINLIB 
our measure of financial liberalization; M a vector of control variables; and ε the error term. 
We estimate a fixed effects model with clustered standard errors.8 
Our financial liberalization measure can take values between 0 and 21.9 The vector M consists 
of nine control variables. It includes the annual inflation rate (measured as the annual change 
in the GDP deflator). This control variable has been used in several previous studies, because 
it signals the risks and costs for residents of a country to hold their wealth domestically. It 
may also be interpreted as an (indirect) signal of the quality of government policies and the 
extent to which these policies are geared towards long-term stability of the economy. We 
further add the one-period lagged annual change of GDP per capita and the government 
consumption to GDP ratio to capture the overall macroeconomic environment. Moreover, we 
include the annual change in the amount of external borrowing, because previous research has 
shown this to be an important determinant of capital flight, pointing out that external debt 
may fuel capital outflows (also known as the “revolving door”; see, among others, Boyce, 
1992; Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003). Next, we use the stock of external debt to GDP ratio as a 
control variable, because high external debt may signal the risk of future tax payments and/or 
overall macroeconomic instability. Also, the one-period lagged value of the capital flight to 
GDP ratio is used as a control variable, because in previous research it has been shown that 
capital flight tends to persist, a phenomenon referred to habit formation (Ndikumana et al., 
2014).10 Furthermore, we control for the political regime in a country, using data from the 
                                                          
8
 The estimations have also been carried out using OLS and random effects. These results (not tabulated) are 
quantitatively similar to those reported in tables 4 through 9. 
9
 Normalizing our financial liberalization measure to observations that take values between 0 and 1 instead of 
ranging between 0 and 21 do not change the results (not tabulated). 
10
 We acknowledge that using the lagged dependent variable as one of the independent variables in a panel 
data fixed effects model may be problematic as it may give biased estimates. In the literature, this is generally 
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Polity IV project database. In particular, we use the Polity2 variable, which is an aggregate 
democracy variable that runs from -10 to 10, where a higher value means a more democratic 
regime. Finally, we take year effects into account. We specify these year effects by adding a 
year dummy and a year dummy squared to our model to allow for the fact that these year 
effects may be non-linear—during some periods capital flight may have been rising 
continuously, whereas during other periods it may have gone down. When looking at the data 
in table 3 the influence of time trends may indeed be important for several countries as capital 
flight seems to have been showing cyclical patterns over the years. In particular, for the 
African countries in our dataset over the period 1973–2005, the capital flight figures exhibit 
an inverted-U shaped form, implying that the amount of capital flight on average goes up until 
the mid-1990s, after which there seems to be a downward sloping trend. We also note that at 
the end of the period, capital flight seems to rise again. 
6. Empirical results 
We estimate the model specified in equation (2) without and with control variables. Table 4 
shows the results of the simple fixed effects estimations, where we only include financial 
liberalization variables. The results in column [1] of the table indicate that the relationship 
between our overall financial liberalization index and capital flight is negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that capital flight is significantly lower in countries that have carried 
out more financial reforms.11 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
referred to as the Nickell (1981) bias. One way to solve this is to use an instrumental variable estimation 
method. Using such an approach in many cases may pose other problems and restrictions, however. In the 
literature it has been suggested that if the time dimension of the dataset is sufficiently long (i.e., the number of 
years for which data are available should be 20 or more; see Beck and Katz, 2011), the Nickell bias may not be 
that severe and the benefits of applying an instrumental variable approach, such as GMM, may not outweigh 
its costs. Therefore, since we have data for over 30 years, we do not apply GMM, but stick to the outcomes of 
the fixed effects estimations. 
11
 We redo the analysis as reported in column [1] using the financial liberalization index without the financial 




In columns [2] to [9] we repeat the estimation, but instead of using the financial liberalization 
index, we use the data for the various dimensions reflecting financial liberalization separately. 
With respect to the dimension credit controls, we also take into account separately the sub-
dimensions directed credit and credit ceilings. In addition, we take into account interest rate 
controls, entry barriers (referring to licensing requirements for newly established domestic and 
foreign financial institutions, as well as for certain types of banking practices), privatization 
(referring to the extent to which control over the banking sector by the government has been 
reduced), capital flow controls (referring to capital account controls and restrictions, transaction 
taxes, and the use of multiple exchange rates) and security markets (relating to policies creating 
and/or improving security markets and security market trade). For all dimensions we find a 
negative and significant relationship between financial liberalization and capital flight, again 
supporting the view that capital flight is significantly lower in countries that have carried out 
more financial reforms. The results presented in columns [2] through [9] thus seem to support 
that financial liberalization matters for capital flight. At the same time, its contribution to 
explaining capital flight appears to be small as indicated by the very low levels of the R 
squared. 
As was stated in section 2, emphasis is placed on capital account liberalization in the literature 
analyzing the consequences of financial liberalization. One of the frequently used 
liberalization measures is the financial openness index constructed by Chinn and Ito (2008). 
This index measures the extent to which a country has opened up its capital account, where a 
higher value refers to a more open capital account. The index is comparable to our capital 
flow controls measure for which we report our results in column [8] of table 4. One important 
limitation of the Chinn and Ito index is that it focuses on only one dimension of financial 
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liberalization. Yet, we report results of estimations using this index for completeness. Column 
[10] shows that we do not find evidence that capital account openness as measured by this 
index is associated with capital flight. 
The results presented in table 4 merely show correlations between capital flight and financial 
liberalization, although we do control for country-specific effects, because as stated above, the 
analyses have been carried out using fixed effects. Still, to reduce the possibility of omitted 
variable bias, we need control variables that may at least potentially be important antecedents 
of capital flight. In table 5 we therefore repeat the analysis presented in table 4 and add a set 
of control variables, which we described in section 5. Adding control variables substantially 
increases the explanatory power of the model as illustrated by the much higher R squared. 
Adding these controls also significantly influences our results, indicating the importance of 
controlling for variables that proxy for alternative determinants of capital flight. Now, the 
overall financial liberalization index is no longer statistically significant. This also holds for 
several of the dimensions reflecting financial liberalization of the banking sector, namely, for 
policies related to credit controls, directed credit, credit ceilings, and interest rate controls, as 
well as for the liberalization of security markets.  We do, however, find a statistically significant 
negative association between policies focusing on bank privatization and policies reducing bank 
entry barriers, on the one hand, and capital flight on the other. These types of policies thus seem 
to be able to reduce the extent of capital flight that a country is experiencing. Relaxing entry 
barriers for banks and bank privatization programs directly increases bank competition, which 
helps to increase the attractiveness for residents to invest their money at home. At the same 
time, the results in table 5 also show that in the case of policies focusing on reducing capital 
account controls, we find a statistically significant positive relationship. This lends support to 
the argument that, especially with this type of financial liberalization policy, capital may flow 
in and out of the country much more easily. In other words, such policies stimulate rather than 
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reduce capital flight. The latter result is confirmed by the analysis when using the Chinn-Ito 
index of financial openness, presented in column [10], although the coefficient for this 
variable is not statistically significant.  
<Table 5> 
The results for most of the control variables are not statistically significant in the 
specifications shown in table 5, with two exceptions. First, the change of debt is highly 
significant and seems to be a very important determinant of capital flight. This confirms the 
“revolving door” hypothesis that external borrowing fuels capital flight, a result that has been 
found in other studies as well (Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003, 2011; Collier et al., 2004; Beja, 
2007b). The strong correlation between external borrowing and capital flight has been 
associated with illegal transfers and the embezzlement of externally borrowed funds 
(Ndikumana et al., 2014). Second, the inflation rate is positively and significantly related to 
capital flight, confirming the hypothesis that high rates of inflation have an adverse impact on 
the risk-adjusted rate of return on domestic investment. There is also weak evidence that 
capital flight shows a cyclical pattern over time, because in some of the specifications 
presented in table 5 the coefficient on the squared term of the time trend is statistically 
significant. Based on the results presented in table 5, we conclude that, even after controlling 
for other variables that may explain the capital flight phenomenon, still some types of 
financial liberalization policies remain relevant in explaining capital flight. 
Robustness checks 
We continue carrying out a number of robustness checks. First, we transform the financial 
liberalization index, as well as the variables representing the various dimensions of financial 
liberalization, into dummy variables. One potential criticism of the data we use is that the 
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financial reform variables take values from 0 to 21 (and from 0 to 3 for the separate 
dimensions of financial liberalization), assuming that they can be interpreted as continuous 
variables. Yet, the variables are ordinal, meaning that we must be careful in interpreting the 
results of the fixed effects regression results. To analyze whether our interpretation of the 
estimation results in table 5 is justified, we create dummy variables, which take the value 1 if 
the overall financial liberalization index (or the index for a specific dimension) is above the 
average value of the overall index (or dimension) and 0 otherwise.12 The results are shown in 
table 6, which are similar to those in table 5. Again, we find that for the overall financial 
liberalization index, as well as for several of the dimensions reflecting financial liberalization 
of the banking sector and liberalization of the securities markets, there is no statistically 
significant association with capital flight, but we do find a statistically significant negative 
association between policies reducing bank entry barriers. We also find that policies focusing 
on reducing capital account controls are associated positively with capital flight, 
corroborating the results shown in table 5. The latter result is confirmed when using the 
Chinn-Ito index of financial openness, although again the coefficient for this variable is not 
statistically significant. The only difference between the results in tables 5 and 6 is that in 
table 6 we do not find a statistically significant negative relationship between policies 
focusing on bank privatization and capital flight (although the coefficient of the privatization 
variable is close to being statistically significant). Overall, however, the results in table 6 
(including those of the control variables) confirm those presented in table 5. 
<Table 6> 
Next, in table 7 we present the results of the estimation, leaving out South Africa and the 
North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia). One may argue that these 
                                                          
12
 Average values refer to the sample average over the entire sample period. 
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countries are different as they are in a different stage of economic development. Most 
importantly, financial market development and per capita income of these countries are 
significantly higher than in the other countries in our sample. In order to control for the fact 
that the different macroeconomic settings of these countries may drive the results of the 
relationship between financial liberalization and capital flight for the African region as a 
whole, we re-estimate our models without these countries. This means that we focus on a sub-
sample of purely sub-Saharan African countries (excluding South Africa). The results 
presented in table 7 are very similar to those reported in table 5. Again, we find that for the 
overall financial liberalization index, as well as for several of the dimensions reflecting 
financial liberalization of the banking sector and liberalization of the securities markets, there is 
no statistically significant association with capital flight. At the same time, we do find a 
statistically significant negative association between policies focusing on bank privatization and 
policies reducing bank entry barriers, on the one hand, and capital flight on the other. We also 
find that policies focusing on reducing capital account controls are associated positively with 
capital flight. The latter result is confirmed when using the Chinn-Ito index of financial 
openness, as the coefficient for this variable is statistically significant. We therefore conclude 
that the analysis presented in table 7 corroborates those presented in tables 5 and 6. 
<Table 7> 
As a third robustness check we leave out South Africa. This country takes a unique position in 
the region. Since the early 1990s, South Africa has experienced a strong overall liberalization 
of its economy and much lower levels of capital flight relative to its GDP. By dropping this 
country from the sample we are able to verify whether or not our results are driven by the 
more liberalized economy of South Africa. The results, presented in table 8, do not support 
this conjecture. We again find clear evidence that policies focusing on bank privatization and 
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policies reducing bank entry barriers are negatively associated with capital flight, and that 
policies focusing on reducing capital account controls are associated positively with capital 
flight. 
<Table 8> 
Finally, we analyze the relationship between financial liberalization and capital flight by using 
only the data for the period from 1990 onwards. As figures 1 and 2 clearly show, the trend in 
financial liberalization shows a structural break starting around 1988–1990. Financial 
liberalization takes off from the late 1980s for most countries in the sample. In order to 
analyze the impact of this trend, we control for this structural break and do a sub-sample test 
by focusing on the post-1980s period only. This almost halves the number of observations. 
Table 9 reports the results of this analysis.13 Focusing only on the data from 1990 onwards 
does support our previous results with respect to the financial liberalization variables, with 
one exception: we no longer find a significant positive association between policies focusing 
on reducing capital account controls and capital flight (although the coefficient is close to 
being statistically significant). At the same time, we still find that policies focusing on bank 
privatization and policies reducing bank entry barriers are negatively associated with capital 
flight. Moreover, we also report a significant and negative association between the overall 
financial liberalization index and capital flight, serving as an additional support for the 
importance of financial liberalization policies in explaining the capital flight phenomenon.  
With respect to the controls, the behavior of several of these variables appears to be different 
from what we have reported in previous analyses based on the full sample period. To begin 
with, the change of debt remains the dominant variable explaining capital flight. Yet, two other 
                                                          
13
 We have left out the time trend variables, because the period 1990–2005 covers the period after the 
structural break we observed in the capital flight data. As discussed in section 5, capital flight relative to GDP on 
average goes up until the mid-1990s, after which there seems to be a downward sloping trend in terms of the 
amount of capital flight relative to GDP for some of the African countries in our dataset. 
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variables now also appear to be significantly related to capital flight. First, the stock of debt is 
positively and significantly associated with capital flight. This may indicate that residents fear 
that high debt levels may lead to higher future tax claims by the government and/or that they 
take these high debt levels as a signal of macroeconomic mismanagement. In both cases, this 
may be an incentive to invest wealth abroad. Second, the government consumption to GDP ratio 
is also positively associated with capital flight. Again, this may indicate that residents engage in 
capital flight for fear of higher future tax payments and/or macroeconomic instability, because 
this erodes their domestically-held wealth. Finally, in contrast to the estimation results in the 
previous tables, the inflation rate is no longer statistically significant. 
<Table 9> 
7. Summary and conclusions 
During the past two to three decades, many African countries experienced considerable 
capital flight, as residents moved their wealth abroad, using different ways to accumulate 
foreign assets. At the same time, several of these countries reformed their domestic financial 
markets in an attempt to improve the functioning of their domestic financial systems and to 
increase the efficiency of resource allocation—that is, to enhance financial development. 
Although the empirical literature has discussed potential factors that may determine the 
occurrence and size capital flight, only very few studies have investigated the relationship 
between financial liberalization and capital flight. In this study, we have focused on analyzing 
this relationship using data for a sample of 18 African countries for the period 1973–2005.  
From a theoretical perspective, the relationship between financial liberalization and capital 
flight may go both ways. On the one hand, financial liberalization policies may increase the 
risk-adjusted return on domestically invested capital compared to investment held abroad. 
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Moreover, financial liberalization may be seen as a credible signal of the government’s 
commitment to sound economic management, leading to improved domestic policy making, 
reduced policy uncertainty, and enhanced institutional quality. If this is the case, financial 
liberalization leads to reduced capital flight. On the other hand, however, with financial 
liberalization, capital may flow abroad more easily. If individuals have incentives to hold their 
wealth abroad, then financial liberalization makes it easier to allocate capital outside the 
country.  
Overall, our analysis provides support for the hypothesis that financial liberalization and 
capital flight are related. The nature of this relationship very much depends on the type of 
financial liberalization policy, however. Thus, whereas policies focusing on bank privatization 
and policies reducing bank entry barriers reduce capital flight, liberalizing international capital 
controls may actually increase capital flight.  
We acknowledge that the contribution of financial liberalization policies to explaining 
patterns of capital flight appears to be relatively small as compared to other explanations that 
have been discussed in the literature. Our analysis indeed made clear that external debt-fueled 
capital flight is a dominant phenomenon, a finding that is line with other studies. Still, even 
after controlling for this phenomenon, as well as for other determinants of capital flight 
mentioned in previous literature, some types of financial liberalization policies remain 
relevant in explaining capital flight. We therefore conclude that the outcomes of this study are 
relevant for financial market policies. At the same time, based on the analysis in this paper 
and in line with Lensink et al. (1998), we conclude that, while certain types of financial 




The outcomes of the analysis also support our approach to take into account various 
dimensions of financial liberalization instead of looking at just one dimension or taking a 
composite measure of liberalization. As discussed in section 2 of this paper, most of the 
previous studies focused on just one aspect of financial liberalization, mainly capital account 
liberalization. While this dimension, too, turns out to be important in our study, focusing on 
this type of measure would tell only half the story: our analysis suggests that there seem be 
other dimensions of liberalization that can be equally important for curtailing capital flight. 
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Figure 1: Financial Liberalization in Africa, 1973–2005: Distribution of policy changes (in percentages) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Abiad et al. (2010). 
 
Status quo = No change in overall financial liberalization measure 
Large reform = Increase in overall financial liberalization measure of three or more 
Reform = Increase in overall financial liberalization measure 
Reversal = Decrease in overall financial liberalization measure 




















































































































































Figure 2: Financial liberalization in Africa, 1973–2005: Trends per country 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Abiad et al. (2010). 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the various financial liberalization measures, 1973–2005 




594 0 18.25 7.13 5.3 
Credit controls 594 0 3 1.27 1.04 
Interest rate controls 594 0 3 1.20 1.28 
Entry barriers 594 0 3 1.61 1.20 
Privatization 594 0 3 0.92 1.11 
International financial 
transactions 
594 0 3 0.92 0.86 
Security markets 594 0 3 0.78 0.76 
Regulatory reforms 594 0 3 0.43 0.65 
Large reversal 576 0 1 0.003 0.06 
Reversal 576 0 1 0.03 0.18 
Reform 576 0 1 0.21 0.41 
Large reform 576 0 1 0.04 0.20 
Status quo 576 0 1 0.71 0.45 





Table 2: Overall financial liberalization measure per country, five-year averages 
Country Years Index Country Years Index Country Years Index 
Algeria 1973–77 2.5 Ghana 1973–77 0 Senegal 1973–77 2.75 
Algeria 1978–82 2.5 Ghana 1978–82 0 Senegal 1978–82 2.75 
Algeria 1983–87 3.5 Ghana 1983–87 0.8 Senegal 1983–87 3.95 
Algeria 1988–92 5.35 Ghana 1988–92 6.2 Senegal 1988–92 8.15 
Algeria 1993–97 9.15 Ghana 1993–97 7.4 Senegal 1993–97 11.4 
Algeria 1998–02 10.25 Ghana 1998–02 9.33 Senegal 1998–02 12.8 
Algeria 2003–05 10.25 Ghana 2003–05 9.4 Senegal 2003–05 13.67 
Burkina-Faso 1973–77 2.35 Kenya 1973–77 5.75 South Africa 1973–77 4.5 
Burkina-Faso 1978–82 2.75 Kenya 1978–82 6.75 South Africa 1978–82 6.15 
Burkina-Faso 1983–87 2.75 Kenya 1983–87 6.75 South Africa 1983–87 10.25 
Burkina-Faso 1988–92 5.55 Kenya 1988–92 7.3 South Africa 1988–92 10.85 
Burkina-Faso 1993–97 9 Kenya 1993–97 10.3 South Africa 1993–97 14.65 
Burkina-Faso 1998–02 12 Kenya 1998–02 13.3 South Africa 1998–02 16.25 
Burkina-Faso 2003–05 12 Kenya 2003–05 14.17 South Africa 2003–05 16.25 
Cameroon 1973–77 2.75 Madagascar 1973–77 2.4 Tanzania 1973–77 0 
Cameroon 1978–82 2.75 Madagascar 1978–82 3 Tanzania 1978–82 0 
Cameroon 1983–87 2.75 Madagascar 1983–87 4.5 Tanzania 1983-87 0 
Cameroon 1988–92 3.15 Madagascar 1988–92 8.65 Tanzania 1988-92 1.6 
Cameroon 1993–97 6.65 Madagascar 1993–97 11.05 Tanzania 1993–97 10.25 
Cameroon 1998–02 11.6 Madagascar 1998–02 13 Tanzania 1998–02 12.6 
Cameroon 2003–05 12 Madagascar 2003–05 14.25 Tanzania 2003–05 15 
Cote d’ Ivoire 1973–77 7.15 Morocco 1973–77 1 Tunisia 1973–77 2.75 
Cote d’ Ivoire 1978–82 7.75 Morocco 1978–-
82 
1.6 Tunisia 1978–82 2.75 
Cote d’ Ivoire 1983–87 7.75 Morocco 1983–87 2 Tunisia 1983–87 2.95 
Cote d’ Ivoire 1988–92 8.85 Morocco 1988–92 3.8 Tunisia 1988–92 4.35 
Cote d’ Ivoire 1993–97 12.7 Morocco 1993–97 10.2 Tunisia 1993–97 10.55 
Cote d’ Ivoire 1998–02 13 Morocco 1998–02 13 Tunisia 1998–02 12.67 
Cote d’ Ivoire 2003–05 13 Morocco 2003–05 13 Tunisia 2003–05 13 
Egypt 1973–77 0 Mozambique 1973–77 1 Uganda 1973–77 2.75 
Egypt 1978–82 0 Mozambique 1978–82 1 Uganda 1978–82 2.75 
Egypt 1983–87 0 Mozambique 1983–87 1 Uganda 1983–87 3.15 
Egypt 1988–92 2.8 Mozambique 1988–92 1.15 Uganda 1988–92 4.3 
Egypt 1993–97 11.2 Mozambique 1993–97 8.6 Uganda 1993–97 10.1 
Egypt 1998–02 12 Mozambique 1998–02 13.85 Uganda 1998–02 12.5 
Egypt 2003–05 13 Mozambique 2003–05 14 Uganda 2003–05 13.7 
Ethiopia 1973–77 0 Nigeria 1973–77 4.95 Zimbabwe 1973–77 3 
Ethiopia 1978–82 0 Nigeria 1978–82 5.15 Zimbabwe 1978–82 3.8 
Ethiopia 1983–87 0.4 Nigeria 1983–87 5.95 Zimbabwe 1983–87 4 
Ethiopia 1988–92 2.2 Nigeria 1988–92 8.95 Zimbabwe 1988–92 5.85 
Ethiopia 1993–97 2.6 Nigeria 1993–97 10.25 Zimbabwe 1993–97 10.75 
Ethiopia 1998–02 5.6 Nigeria 1998–02 14.55 Zimbabwe 1998–02 12.2 
Ethiopia 2003–05 7 Nigeria 2003–05 15 Zimbabwe 2003–05 12.95 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Abiad et al. (2010). 
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Table 3: Capital flight to GDP ratio (CF/Y), five-year averages 
Country Years CF/Y Country Years CF/Y Country Years CF/Y 
Algeria 1973–77 0.097 Ghana 1973–77 0.008 Senegal 1973–77 n.a. 
Algeria 1978–82 0.089 Ghana 1978–82 0.036 Senegal 1978–82 n.a. 
Algeria 1983–87 0.068 Ghana 1983–87 0.051 Senegal 1983–87 n.a. 
Algeria 1988–92 0.071 Ghana 1988–92 0.019 Senegal 1988–92 n.a. 
Algeria 1993–97 0.109 Ghana 1993–97 0.033 Senegal 1993–97 n.a. 
Algeria 1998–02 0.091 Ghana 1998–02 0.040 Senegal 1998–02 n.a. 
Algeria 2003–05 0.095 Ghana 2003–05 0.005 Senegal 2003–05 n.a. 
Burkina-Faso 1973–77 0.020 Kenya 1973–77 0.059 South Africa 1973–77 0.007 
Burkina-Faso 1978–82 0.040 Kenya 1978–82 0.015 South Africa 1978–82 0.020 
Burkina-Faso 1983–87 0.036 Kenya 1983–87 0.028 South Africa 1983–87 0.022 
Burkina-Faso 1988–92 0.038 Kenya 1988–92 -0.002 South Africa 1988–92 0.024 
Burkina-Faso 1993–97 -0.006 Kenya 1993–97 0.005 South Africa 1993–97 -0.013 
Burkina-Faso 1998–02 -0.037 Kenya 1998–02 0.033 South Africa 1998–02 0.102 
Burkina-Faso 2003–05 0.002 Kenya 2003–05 0.037 South Africa 2003–05 -0.017 
Cameroon 1973–77 0.006 Madagascar 1973–77 0.043 Tanzania 1973–77 n.a. 
Cameroon 1978–82 0.066 Madagascar 1978–82 0.022 Tanzania 1978–82 n.a. 
Cameroon 1983–87 0.122 Madagascar 1983–87 0.107 Tanzania 1983–87 n.a. 
Cameroon 1988–92 0.031 Madagascar 1988–92 0.100 Tanzania 1988–92 0.027 
Cameroon 1993–97 0.081 Madagascar 1993–97 0.086 Tanzania 1993–97 0.009 
Cameroon 1998–02 0.090 Madagascar 1998–02 0.016 Tanzania 1998–02 0.036 
Cameroon 2003–05 -0.079 Madagascar 2003–05 -0.003 Tanzania 2003–05 0.045 
Cote d’ Ivoire 1973–77 0.089 Morocco 1973–77 0.048 Tunisia 1973–77 0.026 
Cote d’ Ivoire 1978–82 0.098 Morocco 1978–82 0.007 Tunisia 1978–82 -0.005 
Cote d’ Ivoire 1983–87 0.127 Morocco 1983–87 0.088 Tunisia 1983–87 0.032 
Cote d’ Ivoire 1988–92 0.149 Morocco 1988–92 0.070 Tunisia 1988–92 0.070 
Cote d’ Ivoire 1993–97 0.107 Morocco 1993–97 0.041 Tunisia 1993–97 0.049 
Cote d’ Ivoire 1998–02 0.055 Morocco 1998–02 0.050 Tunisia 1998–02 0.087 
Cote d’ Ivoire 2003–05 0.126 Morocco 2003–05 0.028 Tunisia 2003–05 0.022 
Egypt 1973–77 0.084 Mozambique 1973–77 n.a. Uganda 1973–77 -0.003 
Egypt 1978–82 0.077 Mozambique 1978–82 n.a. Uganda 1978–82 0.098 
Egypt 1983–87 0.061 Mozambique 1983–87 0.324 Uganda 1983–87 0.033 
Egypt 1988–92 0.043 Mozambique 1988–92 0.290 Uganda 1988–92 0.007 
Egypt 1993–97 -0.028 Mozambique 1993–97 0.464 Uganda 1993–97 0.005 
Egypt 1998–02 0.026 Mozambique 1998–02 0.038 Uganda 1998–02 0.013 
Egypt 2003–05 -0.074 Mozambique 2003–05 -0.125 Uganda 2003–05 -0.035 
Ethiopia 1973–77 n.a. Nigeria 1973–77 0.067 Zimbabwe 1973–77 0.021 
Ethiopia 1978–82 0.136 Nigeria 1978–82 0.025 Zimbabwe 1978–82 0.048 
Ethiopia 1983–87 0.063 Nigeria 1983–87 0.141 Zimbabwe 1983–87 0.059 
Ethiopia 1988–92 -0.0003 Nigeria 1988–92 0.159 Zimbabwe 1988–92 0.073 
Ethiopia 1993–97 0.012 Nigeria 1993–97 0.010 Zimbabwe 1993–97 0.079 
Ethiopia 1998–02 0.119 Nigeria 1998–02 0.020 Zimbabwe 1998–02 0.087 
Ethiopia 2003–05 0.085 Nigeria 2003–05 0.165 Zimbabwe 20030–5 -0.105 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Ndikumana and Boyce (2010).
41 
 
Table 4: Financial liberalization and capital flight: Estimation results using the actual index scores, without control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
          
FINLIB -0.008*** 
(0.00) 
         
Directed credit  -0.038*** 
(0.00) 
        
Credit ceilings   -0.010*** 
(0.00) 
       
Credit controls    -0.042*** 
(0.00) 
      
Interest rate 
controls 
    -0.025*** 
(0.00) 
     
Entry barriers      -0.036*** 
(0.00) 
    
Privatization       -0.065*** 
(0.00) 
   
Capital flow 
controls 
       -0.017* 
(0.07) 
  





         -0.013 
(0.17) 
 






















          
Within R squared 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.004 
F-test 30.58*** 23.85*** 27.09*** 30.68*** 17.42*** 21.78*** 47.38*** 3.24* 14.70*** 1.91 
Number of 
observations 
513 513 389 513 513 513 513 513 513 455 
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Note: The dependent variable is the real capital flight to real GDP ratio. All models are estimated using fixed effects and with clustered standard 




Table 5: Financial liberalization and capital flight: Estimation results using the actual index scores, with control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
          
FINLIB -0.002 
(0.54) 
         
Directed credit  -0.005 
(0.63) 
        
Credit ceilings   -0.011 
(0.69) 
       
Credit controls    -0.008 
(0.49) 
      
Interest rate 
controls 
    0.001 
(0.95) 
     
Entry barriers      -0.020* 
(0.06) 
    
Privatization       -0.038*** 
(0.00) 
   
Capital flow 
controls 
       0.040*** 
(0.00) 
  





         0.013 
(0.21) 
 
          




























































GDP growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
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(lagged) (0.45) (0.46) (0.67) (0.44) (0.49) (0.52) (0.40) (0.61) (0.51) (0.74) 




































































































































          
Within R squared 0.34 0.33 0.39 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.33 
F-test  20.82*** 20.80*** 19.24*** 20.83*** 20.76*** 21.31*** 22.18*** 22.45*** 20.77*** 17.51*** 
Number of 
observations 
440 440 321 440 440 440 440 440 440 386 
Note: The dependent variable is the real capital flight to real GDP ratio. All models are estimated using fixed effects and with clustered standard 




Table 6: Financial liberalization and capital flight: Estimation results using dummy variables, with control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
          
FINLIB -0.016 
(0.48) 
         
Directed credit  0.004 
(0.85) 
        
Credit ceilings   -0.011 
(0.69) 
       
Credit controls    0.006 
(0.78) 
      
Interest rate 
controls 
    -0.020 
(0.39) 
     
Entry barriers      -0.048** 
(0.03) 
    
Privatization       -0.035 
(0.14) 
   
Capital flow 
controls 
       0.046** 
(0.03) 
  





         0.017 
(0.38) 
 
          




























































GDP growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0004 
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(lagged) (0.47) (0.50) (0.67) (0.51) (0.44) (0.54) (0.43) (0.59) (0.37) (0.79) 




































































































































          
Within R squared 0.33 0.33 0.39 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.33 
F-test 20.84*** 20.77*** 19.24*** 20.77*** 20.87*** 21.52*** 21.09*** 21.46*** 21.16*** 17.39*** 
Number of 
observations 
440 440 321 440 440 440 440 440 440 386 
Note: The dependent variable is the real capital flight to real GDP ratio. All models are estimated using fixed effects and with clustered standard 




Table 7: Financial liberalization and capital flight: Excluding South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, with control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
          
FINLIB -0.005 
(0.28) 
         
Directed credit  -0.017 
(0.23) 
        
Credit ceilings   -0.014 
(0.71) 
       
Credit controls    -0.021 
(0.20) 
      
Interest rate 
controls 
    0.002 
(0.88) 
     
Entry barriers      -0.038*** 
(0.01) 
    
Privatization       -0.045*** 
(0.01) 
   
Capital flow 
controls 
       0.047*** 
(0.00) 
  





         0.026* 
(0.07) 
 
          




























































GDP growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0003 0.0004 0.001 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0004 
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(lagged) (0.70) (0.72) (0.72) (0.69) (0.86) (0.81) (0.78) (0.92) (0.90) (0.85) 




































































































































          
Within R squared 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.37 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.37 
F-test 16.14*** 16.19*** 13.99*** 16.22*** 15.97*** 17.05*** 17.23*** 17.44*** 15.98*** 13.11*** 
Number of 
observations 
301 301 246 301 301 301 301 301 301 247 
Note: The dependent variable is the real capital flight to real GDP ratio. All models are estimated using fixed effects and with clustered standard 





Table 8: Financial liberalization and capital flight: Excluding South Africa, with control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
          
FINLIB -0.002 
(0.55) 
         
Directed credit  -0.005 
(0.65) 
        
Credit ceilings   -0.011 
(0.70) 
       
Credit controls    -0.008 
(0.51) 
      
Interest rate 
controls 
    0.001 
(0.93) 
     
Entry barriers      -0.020* 
(0.06) 
    
Privatization       -0.039** 
(0.00) 
   
Capital flow 
controls 
       0.041*** 
(0.00) 
  





         0.014 
(0.19) 
 
          




























































GDP growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
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(lagged) (0.42) (0.42) (0.62) (0.41) (0.46) (0.49) (0.37) (0.57) (0.47) (0.68) 




































































































































          
Within R squared 0.34 0.34 0.40 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.33 
F-test 20.65*** 20.63*** 19.03*** 20.67*** 20.60*** 21.14*** 22.01*** 22.30*** 20.61*** 17.38*** 
Number of 
observations 
429 429 310 429 429 429 429 429 429 375 
Note: The dependent variable is the real capital flight to real GDP ratio. All models are estimated using fixed effects and with clustered standard 






Table 9: Financial liberalization and capital flight: 1990-2005 period, with control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
          
FINLIB -0.007** 
(0.04) 
         
Directed credit  -0.014 
(0.33) 
        
Credit ceilings   -0.042 
(0.23) 
       
Credit controls    -0.020 
(0.18) 
      
Interest rate 
controls 
    -0.016 
(0.27) 
     
Entry barriers      -0.034** 
(0.01) 
    
Privatization       -0.051*** 
(0.00) 
   
Capital flow 
controls 
       0.023 
(0.12) 
  





         0.002 
(0.87) 
 

































































Change of debt to 0.570*** 0.581*** 0.693*** 0.575*** 0.587*** 0.577*** 0.520*** 0.578*** 0.580*** 0.580*** 
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GDP (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
























































































          
Within R squared 0.32 0.31 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.32 
F-test 13.17*** 12.55*** 11.20*** 12.71*** 12.60*** 13.57*** 14.47*** 12.83*** 12.64*** 12.45*** 
Number of 
observations 
251 251 187 251 251 251 251 251 251 235 
Note: The dependent variable is the real capital flight to real GDP ratio. All models are estimated using fixed effects and with clustered standard 
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